The philosophical questions about action concern it's nature, it's description and it's explanation. The leading questions are "What a theory of action is possible?", "Are reasons causes?", "What are practical thoughts?" and "What is the formal logic of practical inference?" Gerhard Preyer offers new answers of some old question about the description and the explanation of action and the logical structure of deliberation or practical reasoning which results from the theory of action since the 1950s years. It is argued that a theory of agent can provide an alternative to any theory postulating actions as irreducible entities metaphysically. The author's account presents intention as states irreducible to beliefs and desires. The analysis places also a requirement on a fruitful description of the mind-body problem.

Prof. Dr. phil. Gerhard Preyer lehrt Soziologie an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Er gibt die Zeitschrift ProtoSociology. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (www.protosociology.de) heraus.

Geographical Overview Analytical Philosophy of Action Part I Enigmas of Agency 1. The Reference of Action Description (a) Attributing and Ascribing Action (b) On Critique of the Identity Theory (c) Actions and Body Movement (d) What Sort of Theory of Action is possible? 2. Explaining Action (a) Theoretical and Practical Thinking (b) Belief and Intention (c) Practical Thought (i) Situation (ii) Intention (iii) Practical Thought (d) An Intentional Explanation Part II Practical Reasoning 1. Decision and the Execution of Intention 2. Practical Inference 3. The Humean Theory of Motivation 4. Evaluative Attitude (i) The Extent of the Unified Theory (ii) Cognitive and Evaluative Attitudes References Name Index Subject Index